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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON LABOR, 1948-49
By Betty Jane Swoboda*
* Research Assistant, Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations
Se\cral State laws restricting labor unions were considered by the
United States Supreme Court during its 1948-49 term. Unions con-
tended these laws deprived them of their rights guaranteed under the
Constitution or federal law. In all cases, however, the Court decided the
laws did not conflict with the Constitution or federal laws, and the states
( ould enact and enforce them.
Other Supreme Court decisions of interest to labor during this term
dealt with the meaning of federal laws— The Federal Employer's
Liability Act. the Fair Labor Standards Act (Wage and Hour Law), the
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), and the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act).
This bulletin discusses all the cases in the 1948-49 term of direct
interest in labor-management relations.^
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE LAWS
Among the most talked-about decisions of the Court this term were
those involving state laws prohibiting the closed shop. Unions challenged
the laws as unconstitutional but the Court upheld the right of the states
to pass this kind of law.
Three such cases were considered by the Supreme Court. A Nebraska
constitutional amendment and a North Carolina law- were considered
together. Both forbade employers to discriminate against non-union
workers in hiring or keeping them on the job. They also prohibited both
union-shop and closed-shop contracts.
The unions claimed these laws were unconstitutional. They c ontended
that the laws \iolated the constitutional rights of free speech, free as-
sembly, and the right of petition; that they interfered with the carrying
out of existing contracts, that they treated union workers differently from
non-union workers thus denying union workers equal protection of the
laws, as guaranteed by the 14th amendment to the Constitution, and
that these laws deprived workers of their liberty without due process of
law. The unions also argued that if a union is to preserve its right to
organize, union workers must have the right to refuse to work with non-
union employees. The closed shop, they said, is the means of gaining
equal bargaining power between union and employer.
In a unanimous opinion, the Court disagreed with these arguments.
Thrre is nothing in the language of the laws, the Supreme Court said,
which indicates that the states intended to prohibit freedom of speech,
assembly, or petition.
rhe Constitution guarantees the right of workers to assemble and to
discuss and make plans for bettering their self-interest in jobs, the Court
said. It does not guarantee to unions that no one shall get or hold a job
unless he joins a union and agrees to abide by its plans.
The Court went further, saying that these laws do not interfere with
the carrying out of existing contracts, and they do not deny to union
members any protection which is granted to non-union workers. "In
identical language these laws forbid employers to discriminate against
union and non-union members. Nebraska and North Carolina thus com-
mand equal employment opportunities for both groups of workers."^
Since the Court held that the state has power to forbid discrimination
against non-union workers, it may also prohibit closed shop contracts,
since such contracts would be evidence of discrimination. In the past the
Court had decided that states may enact laws protecting unions without
violating the 14th amendment of the Constitution. Now the Court has
decided a state legislature may also enact laws protecting non-union
workers.
An Arizona constitutional amendment was very similar to the Ne-
braska and North Carolina laws, just discussed. It also prohibited closed
or union shop contracts. It was different in that it did not specifically
prohibit discrimination against union workers.
The unions argued before the Court* that because the amendment
failed to provide the same protection for union as non-union workers, the
union men were at a disadvantage and were denied the equal protection
of Arizona's laws. The Court, in an eight-to-one decision, said the union
workers were not unprotected. Laws passed before the amendment was
approved forbade "yellow-dog" contracts. (In a yellow-dog contract the
employer forced the worker to agree that he would not join a union.)
The Court said it did not believe, therefore, that the union workers were
really denied equal protection of the laws.
Picketing and Free Speech
Another in the long line of cases concerning picketing and free speech
came up before the Court this term. In the ThornhilP case in 1940 the
Court's decision seemed to be a sweeping protection of picketing under
the right of free speech. Since then the Court has been limiting the
gains made by workers in that case. At first the Court said picketing
could be restrained if violence occurred. Then in 1942 the Court decided*^
that a state might curb even peaceful picketing where non-cniployees
picketed a restaurant to force the owner to require a contractor to use
union labor on a separate building he was constructing for the restaurant
owner.
Now the Supreme Court has placed a lurthcr limit on peaceful picket-
ing. The Court decided that picketing is illegal when it is used to force
an employer to violate a state law. The case'^ involved the Ice Wagon
Drivers Union of Kansas City, who were engaged in an organization
drive. Some drivers refused to join the union. To persuade them to join,
the union made agreements with wholesale ice distributors not to sell ice
to non-union drivers. One dealer, Empire, would not enter into such an
agreement. The union set up a picket line to force Empire to agree.
Empire claimed that if it had made the agreement, it would have
been violating a Missouri law making such trade agreements a crime and
could have been sued by the non-union drivers for triple damages.
Empire asked instead for an injunction against the union's picketing.
The trial court issued the injunction.
In its argument before the United States Supreme Court, the union
attacked the right of the state to issue the injunction, as a denial of the
right of free speech. The purpose of the picketing was to better wages
and working conditions. This was a lawful purpose, the union said, and
the violation of the state anti-trade restraint law was only incidental.
The Supreme Court had previously ruled that the states have the
power to prohibit agreements in restraint of trade. The present Court
added unanimously: These laws apply to unions unless they are specifi-
cally exempted. Missouri decided to apply its law to all persons combining
to restrain freedom of trade: unions were not exempt from its provisions.
The activities of the union— the combination, the picketing, and the
publicizing of its case— were part of a single course of action in violation
of Missouri's law. Freedom of speech and press do not mean speaking and
writing which are parts of an action that violates a valid criminal law.
The posters carried by the pickets were used to persuade Empire to violate
the Missouri law by making an agreement with the union. The union was
doing more than exercising freedom of speech and press; it was also
exerting economic pressure to make Empire abide by the union's demands
rather than the state law. The Court held the state could apply its anti-
trade restraint law to unions, businessmen, or others, or exempt any of
them without denying freedom of speech or of the press.
It is not yet clear whether the Court will apply this line of reasoning
to declare that picketing in connection with strikes made unlawful by the
Taft-Hartley Act is also illegal.
Other State Labor Cases
The constitutionality of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, as
applied to certain union activities, was also attacked before the Court.
This law provides that it is an unfair labor practice for employees indi-
vidually or collectively: (1) to intimidate other employees or their fami-
lies, (2) to engage in certain types of picketing unless a majority of
union members have voted for a strike, and (3) to engage in sit-down
strikes or "any concerted efTort to interfere with production except by
leaving the premises in an orderly manner for the purpose of going on
strike."^
The Wisconsin Board administering the law ordered a union to stop
calling "unannounced work stoppages" during the working day in order
to hold union meetings. The union had used the work stoppages to put
pressure on the employer while contract negotiations were deadlocked.
Twenty-seven such meetings were called during a five-month period.
The union challenged the law as being unconstitutional as applied by
the Board. ^ The union argued that the law makes people work against
their wishes, thus imposing involuntary servitude which is prohibited by
the 13th amendment of the Constitution. The union said the law takes
away the constitutional right of freedom of speech and assembly. And,
the union contended, the law conflicts with the constitutional provision
giving Congress the power to regulate commerce between the states. It
also conflicts with the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, the union claimed.
In a 5 to 4 decision the United States Supreme Court said the Wis-
consin Board's action was not unconstitutional or in conflict with fed-
eral law.
Justice Jackson, writing the majority opinion, said the W'isconsin
law does not impose involuntary servitude: it does not make it a crime
for workers either individually or collectively to quit work and it is also
not a violation of free speech and assembly. (This repeats the Court's
ruling in the Nebraska and North Carolina anti-closed-shop cases.)
Nor does the law violate the commerce clause, the court said.
Congress "left open" an area in which the states may control "coercive
tactics" in labor disputes.
Answering the union's claim that the Wisconsin law conflicted with
federal labor law, the majority opinion said the Wagner x\ct did not give
the National Labor Relations Board authority either to permit or forbid
these unannounced work stoppages, and the Taft-Hartley Act does not
forbid them; so there was no conflict between the authority of state and
federal boards. The union claimed that Section 7 of the Wagner Act
gave workers "the right to engage in concerted activities," and Section
13 of the Wagner Act protects "the right to strike."
The Court replied that not all "concerted activities" are protected by
the Wagner Act. as both the Court and the Board had previously ruled,
and Section 13 of the Wagner Act protects a lawful strike but outlaws a
strike to enforce an unfair labor practice. "Tt is only the objectives of a
strike, not the tactics," the Court ruled, which the National Board may
prohibit or supervise. Therefore, the Court decided, there was no federal
authoritv either permitting or forbidding these unannounced work stop-
pages, and the state therefore has the right to use its own power over
such activities.
Justices Douglas and Murphy wrote separate dissenting opinions.
'Ihcv and the two other dissenting justices. Black and Rutledge, said
these union acti\ ities were protected by the Wagner Act. Justice Douglas
was especially concerned that the majority ruling of the Court would
have the effect of leaving the regulation of the manner of calling strikes
wholly to the states. Thus it might mean the states could outlaw strikes
completely in spite of any federal policy to the contrary.
Another case" concerned a Michigan law forbidding the licensing
of a woman as a bartender unless she was the wife or daughter of the
male owner of the bar. It was claimed the law denied "equal protection
of the laws" to the wives and daughters of non-owners. Frankfurter
wrote the opinion for the Court. He said, "Michigan could, beyond
question, forbid all women from working behind a bar." However.
"Michigan cannot play favorites among women without rhyme or
reason." The Court concluded that evidently Michigan's legislators be-
lieved that the ownership of a bar by a barmaid's husband or father
offers them protection that other barmaids would not have. This, the
Court felt, is a reasonable distinction that the state may make.
LABOR RELATIONS LEGISLATION
Some of the cases before the Supreme Court this term dealt with
interpretation of labor relations legislation. Where the case arose before
the National Labor Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) came into
effect, these cases were decided under provisions of the older National
Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) . Rather than deciding the cases only
on the basis of the Wagner Act, however, the Court seems to consider the
Taft-Hartley Act as an aid to determining congressional intent under the
earlier act.
State and Federal Laws
Two decisions which deserve mention concern the dividing lines be-
tween the jurisdiction of a stat(" labor relations board and that of the
National Labor Relations Board.
In one case a telephone company and the union, the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers-AFL, in its plant each brought suit^^
against the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board after the board held
an election among the company employees and certified a rival union,
the Telephone Guild of Wisconsin, as the bargaining agent. The company
and the IBEW claimed that only the National Labor Relations Board
had authority to certify a union in the plant and that the Wisconsin
Board was therefore without jurisdiction in the case.
The Supreme Court held that the Wisconsin Board's action was in
conflict with the Wagner Act. The telephone company is engaged in
interstate commerce, and it is an industry over which the National Board
has "consistently exercised control." There is always danger that a state
board's policies will conflict with those of the National Board. Even
though the National Board had not yet acted, it is the only board with
authority to do so. The fact that Section 10 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act
allows the National Board to transfer jurisdiction to a state agency does
not change the situation (the Court continued), because no such transfer
had taken place. The Wisconsin Board, then, did not have authority to
certify the guild as bargaining representative, even though the National
Board had not acted in any way.
The other case concerns a Wisconsin law which forbids the enforce-
ment of a maintenance-of-membership clause unless the contract con-
taining it is approved by two-thirds of the employees in an election
conducted by the state board.
In 1942 the National Labor Relations Board certified a union as the
bargaining agent for the employees of a plywood company. In 1943 the
War Labor Board directed the company to include a maintenance-of-
membership clause in the union contract. The contract was continued
from year to year and was in effect in 1947 when an employee was fired
for refusing to pay union dues.
The employee complained to the Wisconsin Board. Acting under the
state law mentioned above, the Wisconsin Board declared the company
was guilty of an unfair labor practice since there had been no referendum
by the state board to establish the maintenance-of-membership clause.
The state courts sustained the action of the Wisconsin Board.
In presenting its arguments before the United States Supreme Court,^^
the company maintained: (1) that the Wagner Act (this case arose
before the Taft-Hartley Act went into eflfect) gave the NLRB "exclu-
sive" power to prevent "any unfair labor practice"; (2) that federal law
(at that time) permitted an employer to make a closed shop agreement
with a union^^; (3) that the state board's order conflicted with the
National \N'ar Labor Board's ruling on a niaintenancc-of-membcrship
clause.
The Supreme Court opinion, written by Justice Frankfurter, dis-
counted these arguments. Citing the congressional reports on the Wagner
Act, the Court concluded it was not the intent of Congress that admin-
istration over "unfair labor practices" be exclusively federal. In reply to
the argument that because the Wagner Act permitted closed shops, the
state could not forbid them, the Court declared that the statement con-
cerning closed shops announces national policy but it does not prevent
the states from prohibiting them. That the Taft-Hartley Act permits
states to restrict the making of union security agreements is added indi-
cation of congressional intent, the Court declared. Certification of the
union by the National Board does not keep the state board from carry-
ing out state policy over a matter not governed by federal law. Federal
policy is not exclusive in this area. It allows the states to regulate or
prohibit union or closed shops. The War Labor Board's practice of
including maintenance-of-membership clauses in union contracts was
based on war powers, not the Wagner Act: and the War Labor Board
had ceased to exist before the State Board issued this order.
N L R B Cases
In two cases reviewed by the Supreme Court this term, National Labor
Relations Board findings of unfair labor practices under the Wagner Act
were upheld. Since these rulings were based on sections of the Wagner
Act which were carried over into the Taft-Hartley Act, they will probably
apply now also.
The Board held it was an unfair labor practice, under the Wagner
Act, for a textile company to give a general increase in wages to its
employees without consulting the union after contract negotiations were
at a standstill. The increase was substantially higher than the employer
had offered at any time during the negotiations. The Court^* agreed
with the Board finding that the company was not bargaining in good
faith.
In another case it was declared an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to refuse the use of a company-owned hall in a company-town
for a union organization meeting. The NLRB found that the only reason
the company refused the use of the hall was to prevent organization and
collective bargaining by the employees, and ordered the company to allow
the employees to use it for union meetings. Challenging the Board's
order before the Supreme Court, the company claimed the order was a
violation of its property rights under the Fifth .Amendment of the Con-
stitution. The company also claimed it was only obeying the provisions
of the Wagner Act which prohibit a company's interfering in the forma-
tion of a labor organization.
Not "every interference with property rights is within the Fifth
Amendment," the Court said.^'^ "Inconvenience may be necessary in
order to safeguard the right to collective bargaining." Further, the
Court accepted the Board's opinion that for the company to grant the
use of the hall was not unlawful assistance to the union. The Court ruled,
however, that the Board's order to the employer to let the union use
the hall must be changed to read that the employer must consider the
union's application for the use of the hall on the same basis as other
applications.
This seems to indicate how far the majority ol the Court is willing to
go in granting unions equal treatment with other groups while not
granting them special privileges.
In two important areas of labor relations the Supreme Court denied
review of lower court decisions. This is not the same as affirming the
decisions which the lower courts made but it may indicate that the
Supreme Court's general attitude was similar.
One case^*^ arose in the Seventh Circuit, which includes Illinois. It is
therefore a binding decision in this state. The Circuit Court decided that
the area of "collective bargaining" as set forth in the Wagner Act and
the Taft-Hartley Act amendments includes retirement and pension plans.
This means that employers and unions are required to bargain on these
matters if either side demands it.
Another case^' from the Sixth Circuit upheld the National Labor
Relations Board ruling that an employer must bargain collectively with
a union over merit wage increases for individual workers.
Both of these decisions are important as extensions of the definition
of the area of "collective bargaining" under federal law.
OTHER FEDERAL LAWS DEFINED
In two cases certain sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (Wage
and Hour Law) were interpreted.
In one,^^ the Court decided by a five to four decision that the Act
applies to workers constructing a military base for the United States
Government in Bermuda on land leased to the United States by Great
Britain.
Congress has power to regulate the actions of our citizens in areas
under our control even though they are outside the territorial juris-
diction of the United States. This is set forth in the Constitution
(Article IV, paragraph 3. clause 2) which says Congress shall have power
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to make "needful rules and regulations respeeting the Territory or other
property belonging to the United States." The chief question was
whether the wording of the Wage and Hour Law defining the area in
which the Act applied could be made to include Bermuda. In the Act's
definition the word "possessions" of the United States was used. Looking
at other laws which defined "possessions" the Court found other "far of]
islands with very difTerent economic conditions" included, such as Guam
and Samoa. Since the Wage and Hour Law has such a broad purpose
and includes so many phases of labor relations, the Court decided Con-
gress intended the Act to apply to such a leased area as that in Bermuda.
Justice Jackson wrote the dissent, in which three other Justices joined.
He said that the word "possessions" should not include such areas as
Bermuda. When the lease was signed, American policy was to limit
control to the military base. He thought applying the Wage and Hour
Law to Bermuda would cause Great Britain, or any other nation from
whom we might want to lease bases in the future, to be very resentful.
By such action we would appear to be extending our jurisdiction to
another nation's territory.
In the other important wage and hour case^'' an irrigation company
in the United States claimed its employees were exempt from provisions
of the Wage and Hour Law because they were persons employed in agri-
culture. The company was a mutual company owned by farmers. It did
not sell water, but distributed it to farmers who owned stock in the
company.
The Wage and Hour Law covers workers producing goods for inter-
state commerce, with certain exceptions. Among the exceptions are
workers in agriculture. The Law defines agriculture as ( 1 ) "farming in
all its branches," and (2) "any practice performed either by a farmer
or on a farm incident to or in conjunction with farming."
The company claimed the only way their employees could be covered
by the Act was to say the work of supplying water to the farmers was
part of the production of farm goods for interstate commerce. In that
case, it said, they must be exempt as workers in agriculture.
Pointing out that the law defines the "production of goods for inter-
state commerce" as "any process or occupation necessary to the pro-
duction thereof," the Court declared the work of the irrigation company
is necessary to agricultural production, but that does not mean it is
agricultural production and exempt from the Act.
Taking the two parts of the law's definition of agriculture, the Court
said the first part did not apply to the irrigation company since it owns
no farms and raises no crops. The Court agreed that a portion of the
second part of the definition applied since irrigation is a practice "inci-
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dent to or in conjunction with farming," but it is not performed by
farmers or on a farm. Even though farmers owned the company, the
workers were hired not by them but by the company independent of the
owners. Therefore the company's employees were not exempt from
the Act.
[Note: Since this decision, the United States Coyigress has specifically
exempted mutual irrigation companies from the Act. Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, as amended, 1949. Section 13, [a]. (6).]
Eight Hour Law
The Eight Hour Law ( Walsh-He?.ley Act) provides among other
things that "every contract" of over $10,000 made by or on behalf of
the United States must have a clause restricting work to eight hours a
day unless workers are paid the overtime rate of pay established by the
Secretary of Labor. Special provision is made for employees of private
contractors with the condition that overtime rates are paid for work over
eight hours.
In the 1948-49 term the Court^° was asked to determine whether this
law applies to employees of United States Government contractors in
Iraq and Iran. In the opinion of the Court, Congress did not intend to
apply the Eight Hour Law to such foreign countries because its chief
concern in passing the bill was with labor conditions at home. There is
no provision in the Eight Hour Law. such as that in the Wage and Hour
Law, which covers United States "possessions"; therefore the decision
was different from that in the Bermuda case. It was different also because
the United States had been granted no property rights in Iraq and Iran.
No distinction was made in the Act between citizen and alien la-
borers, so that, if the law applied in foreign countries, citizens of these
countries must be paid the same rates as citizens of the United States. The
Court concluded it was not the intent of Congress to extend the Act to
foreign countries. To do so might upset a foreign country's economy if
U.S. wage rates were paid. The fact that the administrators of the law
had not applied it outside our territory was further evidence to the Court
that it was intended to apply only in the L^nitcd States.
Federal Employers' Liability Act
The Federal Employers' Liability Act makes interstate railroads liable
for damages for injury to their employees if the injury is wholly or in
part caused by the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees
of the railroad. Two cases concern interpretations of the Act by the
United States Supreme Court.
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One"^ concerned the question whether occupational diseases, such as
silicosis, are included in the definition of injuries covered by the Federal
Employers' Liability Act and the Boiler Inspection Act. The Boiler In-
spection Act makes it unlawful for interstate railroads to use locomotives
which are not in proper condition or which have not been inspected
and passed the tests.
A railroad worker had to work where there were large amounts of
silica dust due to improper adjustment of equipment. He acquired sili-
cosis after a period of years and had to quit work. He sued the railroad
for compensation under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The rail-
road argued that the definition of "injury" under the Act means only
injury by accident. According to the Act the injury must be reported
within three years after it occurs in order to claim damages.
The Court decided that silicosis is an injury within the meaning of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act when it results from an employer's
negligence. The "injury" in a case of silicosis occurred when the "accum-
ulated effects" of breathing silica dust for a long period of time finally
resulted in permanent disability. When, through his employer's negligence,
working conditions exist which injure a worker's health, his injury may
be as great because the negligence continued over a long period of time
as when it results suddenly in an accident.
Since, in the Court's view, the Boiler Inspection Act is an addition to
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, it was not intended to narrow the
definition of injury under the Employers' Liability Act, but rather to
provide for health protection as well as accident protection. Four justices
dissented from the majority opinion concerning the Boiler Inspection
Act. They maintained that occupational diseases cannot be read into
the definition of "accidents" under the Boiler Inspection Act.
This case seems to indicate that the Court is extending the definition
of injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act to include occu-
pational diseases as well as accidental injuries. This would mean much
greater protection to interstate railroad employees.
The other case-- involved the Federal Safety Appliance Act. This
Act provides that interstate railroads are responsible for the payment
of damages for the deaths of their employees "resulting in whole or in
part from defective appliances."
A workman's estate sued the railroad for damages under the Act
after the worker was killed when the track car on which he was riding
crashed into the back of a freight train. The train was stopped because
its air brakes were defective— a violation of the Federal Safety Appli-
ance Act.
The trial court directed the jury to return a verdict in favor of the
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railroad because the protection provided by the law against defective
brakes allegedly did not cover employees following and crashing into a
train stopped suddenly because of defective brakes.
In the opinion of the United States Supreme Court, the Act "pro-
tects all that need protection against defective appliances." This includes
workmen riding on the train or crashing into it. In this case the work-
man's estate could recover damages if the equipment was entirely or
partly the cause of the workman's death. The trial court, the Supreme
Court declared, should not have directed a verdict for the railroad, but
should have submitted the evidence to the jury so that it could decide
the cause of death.
The Jones Act
Three suits"^ for damages under the Jones Act appeared before the
Supreme Court for review during the 1948-49 term. The Jones Act ap-
plies the standard of liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
to shipping companies.
The suits concerned the application of the Jones Act to "general
agents" of the United States. Were the "general agents" liable for dam-
ages under the Jones Act for injuries to seamen, due to the negligence
of the ships' officers? The "general agents" were shipping companies
under contract to the United States War Shipping Administration.
The main question, the Supreme Court said, was whether the "general
agent" was the employer of the seaman and therefore liable under the
Jones Act for the injuries. If, instead, the United States was the employer,
the suits would have to be brought against it under the Suits in Admiralty
Act. The solution to the puzzle "Who was the employer?" was deter-
mined by the answer to the question "Whose business was the operation
of the ship?" According to the terms of the contract the United States
kept the possession, management, and navigation of the ship, and had
control of the ship's officers and crew for the entire voyage. The "agent's"
duties were limited to the shoreside business of the ship. The crew were
employees of the United States, not of its "general agents", the Court
concluded: and the shipping company as a "general agent" was not liable
to the seaman for injuries caused by the negligence of the master or crew
of the ship under the Jones Act.
Liability for damages in these cases rested with the United States
as the employer and any suits for damages would have to be brought
under the Suits in Admiralty Act. The Court would not now rule on the
liability question. It would have to be brought up as a new suit. In a
similar case the courts ruled that suits for maintenance and cure — as
well as damages— must be brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act.
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In another casc-^ in\ol\ing scanirn, a member of the Merchant
Marine was permanently disabled and sued the United States govern-
ment for maintenance. The Supreme Court said it was the duty of the
ship's owner to furnish maintenance and cure only until the greatest
possible cure had taken place. The ship's owner was not held permanently
liable or recjuired to make a lump sum payment in settlement lor the
permanent disability.
Longshoremeirt's Act
A decision- ' interpreting a section of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers Compensation Act is worth noting here. A worker lost the sight
of his right eye in an accident not connected with his work. Later he was
hired by a steamship company and in an injury received while working
for them he lost the sight of his left eye. He was totally disabled accord-
ing to the meaning of the Act. It was agreed by all concerned that the
steamship should pay compensation for the loss of the left eye. A question
came up. however, concerning the balance of payment due for total
disability compensation. Should the difTerence be paid by the employer
or should the extra compensation be paid trom the "second injury" fund
provided by the Act?
The section of the Act providing for payments under the "second in-
jury fund" uses the term "previous disability" to describe the first injury.
The worker argued that the definition of "previous disability" applied
only to injuries received during employment. Therefore he could not be
paid out of the "second injury fund", but the employer was liable.
The Supreme Court ruled the definition of disability was not in-
tended to be that narrow. Congress did not intend to distinguish here, the
Court said, between a worker previously injured in industry and one
handicapped by a non-industrial injury. In either case the second injury
was just as serious, as it disabled him totally. The Court said it could
not agree, as contended by the employer, that the use of the second injury
fund for workers whose first injury was non-industrial would soon use
up the fund.
CONCLUSIONS
The Court's decisions do not reflect an attitude clearly favorable to
labor or to management. In about one-half of the cases of the 1948-49
term in which a pro or con issue could be distinguished, the Court's de-
cisions had the effect of being favorable to labor.
The Court is reluctant to declare any laws unconstitutional. This is
usually more true of national than state laws. During 1948-49 it was
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also very true of state laws. The only constitutional questions appearing
before the Court concerned state laws. It is probably unfair to say the
Court's decisions in these cases reflect an attitude either favorable or
unfavorable to labor. They reflected instead the attitudes of state legis-
latures, whose views were frequently unfavorable to organized labor and
who passed laws which happened to be reviewed this term. The Court,
loath to declare any law unconstitutional, went on record as upholding
some restrictive labor legislation.
In cases involving federal laws, the present Court term was concerned
only with statutory interpretation. Broadening the interpretation of in-
jury under the Federal Employer's Liability Act will extend the protec-
tion of the law to a large number of cases not previously thought to be
covered. Provision for payments under the "second injury fund" of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act to workers
whose first injury was not industrial will be a boon to handicapped
workers.
Looking at the state and national labor board cases one sees that the
Court is not so concerned about whether a state adds d. e, and f union
activities to the Taft-Hartley list of a, b, and c unfair labor practices, as it
is concerned about conflicts of national and state policy as to what union
will be certified as the bargaining agent. The Court has declared that in
certification the National Board's authority is exclusive.
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